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ABSTRACT
Machine learning models provide statistically impressive re-
sults which might be individually unreliable. To provide reli-
ability, we propose an Epistemic Classifier (EC) that can pro-
vide justification of its belief using support from the training
dataset as well as quality of reconstruction. Our approach is
based on modified variational auto-encoders that can identify
a semantically meaningful low-dimensional space where per-
ceptually similar instances are close in `2-distance too. Our
results demonstrate improved reliability of predictions and ro-
bust identification of samples with adversarial attacks as com-
pared to baseline of softmax-based thresholding.
Index Terms— Classification, Justified Belief, Reliabil-
ity, Interpretability, Adversarial Attacks
1. INTRODUCTION
Individual prediction reliability is key in safety-critical ap-
plications of machine learning (ML) in healthcare, indus-
trial controls, and autonomy. To provide this reliability,
the notion of epistemic classifiers (EC) was recently in-
troduced in [1]. EC is a classifier that can justify its be-
lief using support/evidence from neighborhoods in multi-
ple layers. EC additionally provides exemplar-based inter-
pretability using those supporting instances. In this paper,
we propose epistemic encoders, where we co-train a vari-
ational auto-encoders (VAE) and a classifier to construct a
low-dimensional semantically-meaningful embedding. The
neighborhood support from training instances is then com-
puted in that embedding to overcome curse of dimensionality
and enforce agreement in `2-distance and semantic similarity.
The VAE can also provide reconstruction score at inference
time, so we also use that as an additional support in the
justification process.
MagNet [2] uses autoencoder reconstruction error to ei-
ther reject or reform potentially adversarial examples before
the example is provided to a classifier. Unlike MagNet, where
the autoencoder is trained independent of the classifier, our
approach performs a joint training. In [3], a classifier was
trained on the latent space of a VAE to generate adversarial
attacks for generative models. Here, we use a similar architec-
ture with co-training to defend the network. Since the support
*Equal contribution
Fig. 1: Illustration of region of: trust (IK0, IK1), confusion
(IMK), and extrapolation (IDK) for 2D-input binary classifi-
cation with Epistemic Classifier using a base NN classifier.
operator in ECs is non-differentiable, it makes it less vulner-
able to, and computationally more expensive for, white-box
attacks compared to MagNet.
We make the following contributions: (a) an approach
to identify a semantically meaningful low-dimensional space
for computing support using `2-distance; (b) introduce re-
construction quality as additional justification mechanism to
identify uncertainties that neighborhood support cannot re-
solve by itself.
2. METHOD
2.1. Epistemic Classifiers (EC)
EC provides an approach to enhance prediction reliability for
a classifier, which builds on the theory of justified true be-
lief from epistemology [4] and extends it to neural networks
(NN) [1]. Specifically, ECs link reliability of predictions on a
test input to characteristics of the support gathered from hid-
den layers of the network. For a given test sample x, ECs
generate support for x using training data as a mechanism to
justify the class prediction for x. The support enables ECs
to characterize the input space into: regions of extrapolation
(I dont know or IDK), regions of confusion (I may know or
IMK), and regions of trust (I know or IK). This enables anno-
tating the classifier output (i.e. its belief) with IK, IMK, and
IDK assertions (see Fig. 1 for illustration). Traditional EC
uses neighborhood-based support across multiple layers of a
NN to obtain this justification. The support Si(x) in ith layer
Fig. 2: Outline of our modified VAE architecture that is co-
trained with the classifier. ‘RB’ stands for the standard resid-
ual block as described in [7].
is defined as [1]:
Si(x) = {f(ω) : ω ∈ X,hi(ω) ∈ Ni(hi(x))}, (1)
where f(·) is function that maps training input to its training
label, hi(·) is the activation value in the ith layer, andNi(·) is
the neighborhood operator over the training data-set X .
The neighborhood operator N is generally defined us-
ing computationally tractable `2-norm distance. However,
as most state-of-the-art classification networks use cascaded
convolutional layers, a `2-norm based distance metric for
layer-activations does not necessarily reflect semantic or per-
ceptual distance, especially in layers away from the output
layer [5, 6]. Hence, use of `2-norm based support from early
layers can lead to an ill-informed justification of the belief (or
output), causing the Epistemic classifier to assert IMK or IDK
frequently in real-world application. In response, we propose
ECs that use VAE to construct a semantically meaningful em-
bedding for support generation and to augment support with
reconstruction loss of the autoencoder. Next, we formally in-
troduce this extension to ECs and show how it imparts better
prediction reliability to ECs.
2.2. Joint encoder-classifier approach
Owing to VAE’s excellent generative properties, we hypothe-
size that the VAE’s latent space is a perceptually meaningful
space for support computation and retains ability to identify
uncertainties without frequent IMK or IDK assertions. VAE
are also known to produce unexpected reconstruction under
adversarial attack [3], which further motivated use of VAE in
this work. Our EC share the ‘encoder’ layers from VAE, as
shown in Fig.2, and is jointly trained with the modified VAE.
VAEs use learned approximate Bayesian inference to gen-
erate a sample that is similar to the training set [5, 8, 9]. It in-
directly maximizes the model distribution P (X) by minimiz-
ing the upper-bound of its negative log-likelihood [9, 8, 10].
In our approach we add another term to the upper-bound that
captures the classification decoding capacity of learned model
distribution. As shown in Fig.2, lets assume z is the latent
code vector of VAE, Q(z|X) is the encoding distribution,
P (X|z) is the decoding distribution, P (z) is the prior nor-
mal distribution imposed in VAE, then we minimize follow-
ing modified loss function for training the model.
L =EX [EQ(z|X)[− logP (X|z)]] (Reconstruction)
+ EX [H(Q(z|X), P (z))] (CrossEntropy(Q,P ))
− EX [H(Q(z|X))] (Entropy(Q))
+ λCEX [H(C(Y |z), C?(Y |X))] (Classification)
(2)
whereC(Y |z) is classification decoding distribution,C?(Y |X)
is the true classification decoding (known for training sam-
ples) and λC is a scalar weight for the classification loss. The
first three terms are from [9], where first term can be inter-
preted as reconstruction loss of the VAE. Rest of the terms can
be seen as regularization terms for model optimization [10].
Second term (CrossEntropy(Q,P )) encourages the posterior
and prior to approach each other, which are chosen to be
multivariate Gaussian in VAE. Third term encourages the
posterior to have non-zero variance, which should be helpful
in avoiding badly scaled gradients during back propagation.
The fourth term captures the categorical cross-entropy for
classification and can be seen as another regularization term
that pushes the VAE model to parameterize latent codes to be
semantically-meaningful and suitable for classification.
2.3. Justification: Support and Reconstruction
We consider both the quality of reconstructed outputs as well
as the support S for justification in our EC. Unlike [1], we use
only the latent code of our VAE to compute the support for in-
put x. Specifically, we use eq.(1) to compute support Sz(x),
where i has only one value corresponding to the encoder out-
put with the latent code z. Our neighborhood operator N (·)
is defined using k-NN neighborhood operation that identifies
k nearest (`2-norm) training samples for an input.
We use two different image dis-similarity metrics to es-
timate the loss R in the reconstructed output as compared
to the input: mean-square error (MSE) and Structural Sim-
ilarity Index (SSIM) [11]. Function Φ(x, x˜, t¯) is used to
identify the quality of reconstruction x˜, using thresholds
t¯ = {tMSE, tSSIM}. Reconstruction quality is identified as
‘Good’ by function Φ if both of the losses are lower than
corresponding thresholds, otherwise it is considered ‘Bad’.
Next we construct justification operator J(x) as
J(x) =
{
Sz(x) if Φ(x, x˜, t¯) = Good,
Sz(x) ∪ φ otherwise,
(3)
where φ is an arbitrary element to reflect bad reconstruc-
tion quality. In other words, when the reconstruction error
is low, J(x) mirrors Sz(x) and the Justification set remains
unchanged. However, when the reconstruction loss is high,
uncertainty in support is increased by adding an arbitrary
element.
Algorithm 1 – Training VAE-based Epistemic Classifier
Require: training set (X,Y ), validation set (Xv, Y v)
Require: trained modified VAE network g
Require: distance metrics for latent code dz
1: zX ← Extract latent code z for training set X
2: Ω← NeighborSearchTree(zX , Y, dz)
3: k, t¯ = JustificationParameters(Xv, Y v,Ω, g)
4: return g, k, t¯,Ω
Algorithm 2 – Inference with our Epistemic Classifier
Require: Test input x
Require: Epistemic classifier G = (g,N , t¯)
1: (yx, x˜)← g(x) . Class & reconstruction predictions
2: zx ← Extract latent code z for input x
3: Sxz ← Ψ(zx,N ) . support of x in latent code
4: Get justification J(x) using Sxz ,Φ(x, x˜, t¯) and Eq. (3)
5: if yx = J(x) then
6: output← (IK, yx)
7: else if yx ⊂ J(x) then . proper subset
8: output← (IMK, yx)
9: else . implies yx 6⊂ J(x)
10: output← (IDK, yx)
11: end if
12: return output
2.4. Algorithm and Implementation
Our EC is build using a trained modified-VAE network g. As
shown in Fig. 2, for an input x network output has two ele-
ments, i.e. g(x) = {y, x˜} where y is label output and x˜ is the
reconstructed output from latent code z. After the network
g is trained using the loss functions described in Sec. 2.2,
the evidence for justification is derived from the training set
(X,Y ) itself, as described in Algorithm. 1. We extract la-
tent codes across training set and construct a ball-tree Ω us-
ing a defined distance metric, which is represented by Neigh-
borSearchTree function. Ball-tree is used for nearest neighbor
search and use `2-metric for computing distances. Justifica-
tionParameters is a function that selects parameters for sup-
port operators. It selects the value of k to define the neigh-
borhood N for the support in latent space. In addition, it also
computes a set of thresholds t¯ using using N th percentile of
each metric across the validation set. Validation set is used to
select value for k and N .
During the inference stage, a testing sample x is used with
proposed EC according to Algorithm 2. The belief of the clas-
sifier is same as the classifier output y. The support of the
input x is computed by function Ψ, which uses its latent code
and Ω to find k nearest neighbors in training set. Function Φ
quantifies the reconstruction quality using SSIM and MSE as
described above. Justification of the belief is then computed
as per eq. (3) using support and reconstruction quality. This
Fig. 3: t-SNE visualization of the latent code z (length-16) for
(left) MNIST, (middle) Fashion-MNIST and (right) GTSRB
dataset.
Fig. 4: Example of reconstruction along with input’s com-
puted support from training set. Support’s reconstruction is
also shown in bottom row.
justification and belief is used to obtain the justified belief of
our classifier. Note that justification set J(·) can be used to
provide interpretable exemplars as evidence for the belief.
We use residual blocks [12, 7] in encoder and decoder part
of our modified VAE shown in Fig. 2. The classifier output
is obtained by adding a single dense layer connection with
ReLU activation to the latent vector z obtained from VAE. For
classification part of the network, we use only the mean part
of the latent code, which is a 16-length vector in our modified
VAE.
3. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
We demonstrate usefulness of our approach with several data-
sets (MNIST [13], Fashion-MNIST [14] and German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [15]) and test predic-
tion reliability under various perturbations and adversarial at-
tacks [16]. Fig. 3 shows t-SNE [17] visualization of the latent
code z learned by our modified VAE for different datasets.
It shows good separability across classes which is meaning-
ful when computing support using `2-norm distance metric
and provides an effective computing space irrespective of di-
mensionality of inputs. Fig. 4 shows example of reconstruc-
tion and support for an input, demonstrating quality of the
Fig. 5: Examples of (a) confusion (IMK) along with their
EC predictions, and (b) inputs affected by adversarial attacks
along with corresponding reconstructed images.
Table 1: Performance of Epistemic Classifier on different dataset with different perturbation. Baseline is the performance using
softmax thresholding. Base model test accuracy on nominal data is provided in the first column.
computed support. Fig. 5 shows a few IMK examples from
MNIST test set and reconstruction for some inputs that were
perturbed by BIM attack [16]. In adversarial attack cases, the
reconstruction loss is high, which allows our EC to detect the
attack.
Similar to [1], we use augmented confusion matrix
(ACM) to quantify performance of EC when testing with
a dataset. ACM consists of three sub-matrices, where each
sub-matrix is a confusion matrix for predicted label versus
true label under assertion of IK (top), IMK (middle), and IDK
(bottom). In this work, we will use following three metrics
derived from ACM to quantify performance: Coverage or
fraction of IK (FIK), accuracy over IK samples (AIK), and
accuracy over non-IK samples (A¬IK). We use values of
(k, N%) as follows MNIST: (10, 99%), Fashion-MNIST:(50,
90%), GTSRB:(50, 70%). Our justification approach is also
compared to a baseline technique that uses thresholding on
softmax outputs of the classifier. For fair comparison, base-
line thresholds were chosen to match FIK to our combined
approach. For adversarial attacks, we use FGSM [18] and
BIM [16] with attack magnitude of 0.2 on the classifier out-
puts. We also study effect of perturbation of inputs using
uniform noise in range [−0.1, 0.1]. For training, MNIST and
Fashion-MNIST image were scaled to the range of [0, 1].
Similar to [1], we group GTSRB traffic sign dataset into eight
types of traffic signs: speed limit, no passing, end of restric-
tion, warning, priority, yield, stop and direction; yielding
34799 training, 4410 validation and 12630 testing images.
Fig. 6 show ACMs with different forms of justification for
an expanded MNIST test set. The expanded MNIST test set
was created by first perturbing each sample from the original
MNIST test set with adversarial BIM-attack of 0.2 magnitude
[16] and then appending these BIM perturbed samples to the
original MNIST test. This resulted into expanded MNIST
Fig. 6: Augmented confusion matrices (ACM) for expanded
MNIST test-set using (a) Baseline, (b) only support-based,
(c) only reconstruction-based, and (d) combined support &
reconstruction based justification. Half of the samples of ex-
panded MNIST test-set were perturbed by BIM-attack of 0.2
magnitude (see text for more details).
test set with twice as many samples as original MNIST test
set, where one half of the samples were BIM-attacked. A re-
liable classifier should achieve high accuracy for IK samples
(AIK) along with high coverage (FIK). Baseline justifica-
tion approach using softmax thresholding (fig. 6a) achieves
highest coverage of 73%, however, with low IK-accuracy of
0.68. It also shows relatively high accuracy over non-IK sam-
ples (A¬IK=0.43), which indicates that the used justification
approach is sub-optimal, possibly resulting into several false
negatives while identifying IK samples. We achieve slightly
better IK-accuracy of 0.79, when only support is used for jus-
tification (fig. 6b), however it is unable to identify several
attacks. Reconstruction based justification (fig. 6c) achieves
higher IK-accuracy, however we achieve highest IK-accuracy
of 0.99 when both support and reconstruction is used for jus-
tification (fig. 6d). Our combined approach also achieves a
coverage of 53%, which is reasonable given that half of the
samples of expanded MNIST test set were BIM-attacked sam-
ples. Note that when only reconstruction is used for justifica-
tion, we define support in eq. 3 as Sz(x) = {yx}, where yx
is the class prediction for input x. This implies that we can-
not assert any belief as IDK when using reconstruction-only
justification, as seen in fig. 6c.
Table 1 compares performance using all datasets with
and without adversarial attack. Baseline achieves good FIK
and AIK for nominal testset but performs poorly with at-
tacks (high FIK with low AIK), which indicates that several
attack samples were incorrectly classified with high confi-
dence. Our combined approach achieves high FIK with good
AIK for nominal testset and shows excellent identification
of attacks by asserting samples as IMK/IDK (almost 100%
for FGSM and highest for BIM) across all data-sets. Results
for BIM-attack shows that FIK for combined approach is
better than Sz and reconstruction combined. This seems to
suggest that Sz and reconstruction provide complementary
information, as hypothesized. When inputs are perturbed by
uniform noise baseline performs well however support based
approach achieves higher FIK with similar accuracy.
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In practice un-trustworthy (IDK/IMK) assertion from EC can
be used to seek help from an expert and these parameters can
be tuned to match the desired frequency to seek expert’s help.
Further, assertion of un-trustworthy classification into IMK
and IDK can reduce the expert’s effort to identify challeng-
ing cases. The computed support also provides a mechanism
for obtaining training examples that the classifier beliefs is
similar to test sample, which can be used for interpretability
purposes.
Our current framework does not enforce any posterior dis-
tribution for each class in the latent space, which can change
the ideal choice of support size for each class. We plan to use
approach described in [10] to enforce similar distribution for
each class for more uniform effect of neighborhood size. Our
reconstructed images are smooth in nature, similar to other
VAE [5], which results in large SSIM loss and explains the
low FIK in presence of large noise in table 1. In future,
we will explore other dis-similarity metrics to address this is-
sue. Presented results show somewhat robust performance to
gray-box or semi-white-box attack on the classifier. In future
work, white-box attack on both classification and reconstruc-
tion will be studied.
In conclusion, we propose an Epistemic Classifier (EC)
that can assert its belief based on justification from training
set and shows robust performance to adversarial attacks. Our
EC obtains semantically-meaningful latent space using modi-
fied VAE for support generation and uses reconstruction as an
additional justification mechanism.
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